Abstract: To meet its commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU plans to implement an emissions trading system with grandfathering of allowances. Besides having distributional impacts, the choice of the grandfathering scheme may affect efficiency if firms anticipate how future allocations depend on upcoming decisions. In this paper, we determine central design rules for optimal grandfathering within a simple two-period model. We find that for (small) open trading systems, where allowance prices are exogenous, first-best second-period grandfathering schemes must not depend on firm-specific decisions in the first period. Second-best schemes correspond to a Ramsey rule of optimal tax differentiation and are generally based on both previous emissions and output.
Introduction
To meet its emissions reduction commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, the EU plans to implement a emissions trading system within the European Community (EU 2001) which covers large installations of energy-intensive industries. It is envisaged to link the trading scheme with other (non- 
An important element of the Directive left open to Member States is the grandfathering mechanism of allowances across industries (installations). Several metrics have been
proposed (Harrison and Radov 2002) for the allocation of allowances across production facilities, most notably output-based approaches (e.g. kilowatt-hours of electricity production) or emission-based approaches (e.g. tons of CO 2 emissions). With respect to policy guidance, a key challenge from an economic point of view is to identify allocation rules that preserve overall economic efficiency.
Grandfathering schemes lead to efficiency losses if firms can increase their grandfathered amount by choosing higher production or emission levels.
1 As a consequence, the literature has stressed the importance of static grandfathering schemes which are only based upon historical information. Abstracting from income and terms-of-tradeeffects, the different metrics then simply have varying distributional impacts but leave production plans of firms unaffected. Grandfathering boils down to non-distortionary lump-sum transfers of allowances (Laan and Nentjes 2001; Woerdman 2001 ).
However, grandfathering schemes which take historical emissions as a basis for allocation within continuous planning cannot completely circumvent the problem of distor-1 For example, initial allocation can be based on past emissions or on standards from a previous command-and-control system. Within the European emissions trading scheme, Germany discusses to use (relative) emissions in 1990 as a basis for grandfathering, in order to not reward firms for "early actions".
tions: Upcoming firms' decisions will determine the emission levels that are "historical" in subsequent periods. For example, grandfathering in 2013-2017 might be based upon activities in [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . Dynamic grandfathering schemes that employ updated information along the time-path in general lead to strategic behavior of firms and, hence, also affect economic efficiency.
Dynamic incentives of grandfathering are studied by Laplante et al. (1997) . They
show that for specific grandfathering schemes strategic behavior of oligopolistic firms during the transition from a command-and-control regime to emissions trading does not necessarily imply welfare losses. In their setting, the aggregate emissions level is endogeneous.
The focus of our paper is different. We develop a simple two-period emissions trading framework to determine general design rules for optimal dynamic grandfathering schemes where the allocation of allowances can be based on output or emission levels of the previous period. Grandfathering, then, acts as a subsidy to production or emissions. We therefore relate the discussion of optimal grandfathering schemes to rules of optimal taxation. We find that the design of optimal grandfathering schemes crucially depends on whether the emissions trading system is closed or open to a larger (the world) market:
• For (small) open trading systems where allowance prices are exogenous, first-best second-period grandfathering schemes must not depend on firm-specific decisions in the initial period. Second-best schemes are based on a weighted combination of first-period output and emission levels. They correspond to a Ramsey-type rule of optimal tax differentiation: The more inelastic output (emissions), the larger should be the weight to output (emissions) in the grandfathering rule.
In the extreme case, grandfathering is exclusively based on output (emissions).
This highlights the importance of firms' (sectors') characteristics when designing a grandfathering scheme.
• If the emissions trading system is closed, first-and second-best rules coincide. To preserve efficiency, grandfathering must not depend on previous output levels.
The optimal grandfathering scheme consists of an assignment proportional to the emissions in the first period plus a term which does not depend on firmspecific decisions in either of the two periods. The proportionality factor must not differ between firms (sectors). Although acting like a subsidy to emissions, this grandfathering scheme cannot lead to an increase of emissions in a closed system, and therefore only affects the nominal allowance price.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We first describe our basic model and show the correspondence between grandfathering and subsidies. We then derive and discuss the conditions for first-and second-best grandfathering rules in the open and the closed emissions trading system. Policy implications are discussed and illustrated for some specific cost structures. Finally, we conclude.
Analytical Framework
We set up a simple two-period partial equilibrium model. 
where the allocation rule is monotonic in q i1 and e i1 , i.e. λ 
Firms anticipate the impact of their first-period decisions on the number of grandfathered permits they receive in period 2. Given an overall emission constraint over the time horizon, the regulatory authority has to guarantee that aggregate emissions assignments do not exceed a pre-specified levelĒ t in period t, i.e. 
Socially optimal allocation
Given the openess/closeness of the system and assuming w.l.o.g. that there is no discounting, the optimal output and emission levels are obtained by maximizing
t if the system is closed. This yields the following first-order conditions (note: index j is used interchangeably with index i)
where the market price of emissions, σ * t , coincides with σ
for the open system. We refer to this as the social optimum ((q it * , e it * ) i , σ * t ) t .
As well-known, in the social optimum the consumer price equals marginal production costs, and marginal abatement costs coincide for all firms.
The decentralized economy
Next, we consider the decentralized economy in which firms can trade their emissions allowances and output on competitive markets. The competitive firm i maximizes its two-period stream of profits
leading to first-order conditions
As in the case of the social planner problem, conditions (4) and (6) imply efficient production and emission plans in period 2: Marginal production and abatement costs equal the prices for the consumption good and emissions allowances, respectively. Comparison with (1) and (2) yields
and, thus, second period allocation does not depend on the grandfathering scheme
In period 1, however, the grandfathering rule, G, drives a wedge between nominal prices and marginal costs (conditions (3) and (5)). If λ i q > 0, the consumer price in period 1, p 1 , is smaller than the implicit producer price p 1 + σ 2 λ i q . The allocation rule therefore provides implicit production subsidies σ 2 λ i q . Analogously, emission subsidies are given by σ 2 λ i e . The nominal first period emission price, σ 1 , is given by σ WM 1
, for the open emission trading system while it depends on the grandfathering scheme for the closed system.
In general, the first period equilibrium is given by (4) and (6) together with
for the open, and P i e i1 =Ē 1 for the closed system. The solution is denoted by
For given prices (p t , σ t ), differentiating (4) and (6), yields
= 0, and
Therefore, increases of λ i q , λ i e lead to increases of emissions and output.
The open emissions trading system
Optimal grandfathering schemes for the (small) open emissions trading system are derived from
s.t.
and
Denoting the Lagrange multipliers by µ E , µ 
Using (3) and (5), conditions (10) -(12) simplify to
If there are no restrictions to the choice of the allocation scheme G, i.e on λ i 0 , the optimal scheme implies µ E = µ The reason is that output and emissions choices will be distorted and efficiency losses occur unless λ 
We can reformulate this system using (cross) price elasticities:
, this leads to
which corresponds to a Ramsey-formula of optimal taxation (subsidies).
This formula can be substantially simplified. Note that µ i q ≥ 0 and µ E ≥ 0 since the necessary distortions and, hence, efficiency losses increase withĒ 2 . 5 Therefore, (18) and (19) imply:
Proposition 2 In a (small) open economy, second-best grandfathering schemes G for period 2, are determined by either of the following three Ramsey-rules for firm i:
eq , then grandfathering is based on both output and emissions according to:
4 For example, it is often postulated that grandfathering should account for the size and, therefore, for future expansion and shrinkage of firms. As an extreme case, a firm should not perpetually receive allowances although it already dropped out off the market. (ii) if η i< η i eq , then grandfathering is exclusively based on output:
qe , only past emissions determine the number of grandfathered allowances:
The proof is given in the appendix.
Note that Proposition 2 implies that optimal grandfathering schemes (λ i q , λ i e ) can substantially differ across firms: It could be optimal to grandfather to one firm exclusively based on emissions while another should be grandfathered based on a combination of output and emissions. In general, a firm i with more elastic output (less elastic emissions) gets a smaller fraction of grandfathered allowances related to output and a smaller fraction connected to its emissions level. The differences between firms are the larger, the larger
is. Thus, differences between firm-specific grandfathering rules increase in µ E , i.e. in the aggregate numberĒ 2 of allowances to be grandfathered in period 2, and decrease in the second period emissions price σ 2 .
Grandfathering should be based on either output or emissions if the respective crossprice elasticities exceed the price-elasticities. Here, the relative subsidies are inverse to the price-elasticity of output (emissions). In this case it would even be efficiencyincreasing to negatively correlate grandfathering with the other factor, i.e. to choose λ i e < 0 or λ i q < 0. Such an outcome, however, is ruled out by the (realistic) assumption that grandfathering schemes must be monotonic in both emissions and output.
If, cross-price elasticities are small, optimal grandfathering is based on both emission and output levels, i.e. λ 
which is the standard implication of the Ramsey rule for relative subsidies on output and emissions in proportion to the respective producers prices: (i) The higher the elasticity of emissions with respect to the emissions price, the smaller the relative subsidy on emissions, and (ii) the more elastic output reacts to a price increase, the smaller the relative subsidy on output is. Interpreting c it (q, e) as the costs of an aggregate input to produce (q, e), one can easily transform the formula into a Corlett-Hague type relationship (Corlett and Hague 1953) . The (intuitive) interpretation then is straightforward:
The better substitutable the aggregated input is to emissions, the larger the subsidies on emissions compared to those on output.
We illustrate proposition 2 by the following simple examples for the two-firms-case:
Assume that η i qe = η i eq = 0. Then, as long as all price elasticities η i xx > 0 (x = q, e), λ i x > 0 for all i, x, and optimal relative subsidies are given by the inverse elasticity rule:
ee , where
Therefore, in this case, η i− η i eq < 0, and Proposition 2 implies that emissions must not be subsidized, i.e. λ i e = 0, whereas the optimal grandfathering rule λ i q for firm i is given by τ
The closed emissions trading system
If the emissions trading scheme is closed, i.e. P i e it =Ē t , first period equilibrium again depends on the specific grandfathering rule and is given by (4) and (6). Instead of solving the social welfare maximization problem explicitly, the social optimum, which is given by (1) and (2), can be achieved without relying on lump-sum transfers. To see this, note that if
the equilibrium conditions (4) and (6) simplify to
Given that P i e i1 =Ē 1 , the comparison of (20) and (21) with the social optimum (1) and (2) yields:
i.e. the effective price of allowances, σ 1 − σ * 2 λ e , is independent of λ e . Thus, for any given λ e we can achieve first-best in period 1, ((q i1 * , e i1 * ) i , p * 1 , σ * 1 ). We determine λ e from the grandfathering condition
To summarize, even if lump-sum transfer of allowances are not feasible, i.e. λ i 0 = 0, social optimality is not jeopardized.
Proposition 3 In a closed emissions trading system, first-best second-period grandfathering schemes G consist of an assignment proportional to emission in period 1 plus a term which does not depend on firm-specific decisions, i.e.
Proposition 3 states that efficient grandfathering schemes must not depend on firms'
output levels but are linear in the first-period emission levels. Although the equilibrium allocation and therefore efficiency is independent from the specification of G = (λ i 0 , λ e ) i , different lump-sum transfers λ i 0 clearly have distributional impacts. From a practical policy point of view, it is important to note that the flexibility to account for distributional (equity) concerns without efficiency trade-offs shrinks with the number of permits that can be allocated in a lump-sum way (
In the extreme case, where λ i 0 = 0, there is only one grandfathering scheme that guarantees efficiency.
Corollary 4 If lump-sum transfers are ruled out (λ i 0 = 0) in a closed emissions trading system, the sole grandfathering scheme that warrants efficiency assigns allowances proportional to first-period emissions. The proportionality factor is given by the targeted contraction factor of aggregate emissions, i.e. λ e =Ē 2 /Ē 1 .
Policy implications
A major policy claim in the debate on allocation schemes is that an installation (firm)
should not perpetually receive transfers via the grandfathering rule although it has already been shut down. Otherwise unilateral abatement might provide strong incentives for multinational companies to relocate production activities to non-abating regions while reaping allowance credits for closed installations in regions that form part of the abatement regime. The allocation rule could meet such concerns by choosing λ i 0 = 0, i.e. by using the discussed second-best allocations rules. Then, if a firm is closed in period 1 (e i1 = q i1 = 0), it receives no emissions allowances in period 2 (as well as in subsequent periods which are not modelled here). In the closed system, economic efficiency, i.e. the decision to maintain or drop the installation, will not be affected since the effective costs of holding emission allowances do not depend on the choice of λ e . In the open system, however, efficiency requires λ second-best allocation rules for dynamic grandfathering schemes with concretions to an open or a closed trading system. In the open system, first-best requires lump-sum allocation while second-best rules correspond to a Ramsey-formula and are generally based on a combination of output and emission levels. In the closed system, however, efficient grandfathering requires independence of the allocation of previous output levels, i.e. the initial allocation must be linear in past emission levels.
In real practice, implementation of even second-best rules across EU Member States may not be possible due to various reasons. Allocation rules typically addressed in the policy debate are either based on emissions or output. For concrete policy advice, it may therefore be crucial to quantify the magnitude of efficiency losses associated with alternative policy-relevant allocation schemes.
Appendix Proof of proposition 2:
We first rewrite (18) 
